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Abstract 
Purpose 
This paper reviews the literature on information mismanagement and constructs a typology of misinformation that 
can be applied to analyse project planning and strategic planning processes to reduce the chances of failure that 
results from information mismanagement. The aim of this paper is to summarize the research on information 
mismanagement and provide guidance to managers concerning how to minimize the negative consequences of 
information mismanagement and to academics concerning how to research and analyse case studies that might 
involve information mismanagement. 
 
Design/methodology/approach 
Literature review accompanied by conceptual analysis. 
 
Findings 
Information mismanagement is widespread in organizations, so all those involved in managing and researching them 
need to be far more aware of the damage that can be done by it. 
 
Research limitations/implications 
The research is based upon Western society (Europe and North America). The same research should be carried out in 
other parts of the world. Also, all the case studies could usefully be investigated in more depth to apply the 
taxonomy. 
 
Practical implications 
Managers should be much more aware of their own and others’ tendencies to mismanage information to their own 
benefit. 
 
Social implications 
Stakeholders in public sector activities, including citizens, should be much more aware of the tendency of 
government and the public sector to mismanage information to justify particular policy approaches and to disguise 
failure. 
 
Originality/value 
The taxonomy on information mismanagement is original, as is its application to project planning and strategic 
decision making. 
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Article Classification 
Conceptual paper. 
 
Introduction 
There have been many recent examples of what we call “dark side information behaviour” (DSIB), but no reliable 
studies of its frequency or severity of impact, partly because there is no accepted taxonomy of DSIB or way of 
measuring it or its impact. However, the increasing focus on the incentives operating on managers, stimulated partly 
by the rise of organizational and behavioural economics and finance (e.g. Kahneman et al., 1991), and related 
aspects such as agency theory (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989), has led to the creation of many tools to identify and analyse 
DSIB. Environmental factors, such as the deregulation of financial markets, the globalization of trade, the collapse of 
communism and the increasing incidence of outsourcing, have increased incentives to engage in DSIB and the ease 
of doing so. Meanwhile, insistence of regulators on stronger disclosure has led to many revelations that would not 
otherwise have taken place. 
 
Academic researchers are hampered in organizational DSIB, compared to, for example, research into consumer DSIB. 
While consumers may admit to certain kinds of DSIB, or organizations may release information about the DSIB of 
their consumers (e.g. fraud), it is less likely that managers questioned about their own DSIB will be honest. Those 
whose DSIB is most extreme may be best at concealing it! However, in the age of the Internet, piecing together case 
studies of managerial DSIB is easier, due to the many public domain sources readily accessible. Individually, they 
might not reveal DSIB, but put together, particularly when researchers know what they are looking for, they can 
present a very different picture. 
 
Known unknowns and the world of Rumsfeld 
Before analysing the literature and case studies, we need to explore issues relating to what protagonists (those 
inside organizations involved in making decisions) and other stakeholders knew – or did not, before, during and after 
the initiative (plan or project where the DSIB is alleged to have taken place, and what analysts (those viewing the 
situation from the outside) know or knew. Issues include: 
• What was knowable at the time 
• Analysts’ wisdom in retrospect (what analysts later found out about the situation) 
• Protagonists’ wisdom in retrospect (what protagonists later admitted or denied about the situation, perhaps 
in response to others’ wisdom in retrospect - their response might range from denial or reengineering of the 
facts to honesty) 
• The balance/contrast between analyst and protagonist wisdom (one’s word against another’s) 
 
The latter three issues will be explored mainly in the context of the literature and the individual case studies, but the 
first merits a short section of its own. 
 
Donald Rumsfeld, then US Secretary of Defense, stated at a 2002 press conference that “……we know there are 
known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not known. However, there are also unknown 
unknown – the ones we don’t know we don’t know.” Although he was mocked by some at the time, he was making a 
serious statement reflecting common issues in risk and project management (U.S. Department of Defence, 2018). In 
fact, it is more complicated than Rumsfeld suggested. If we take the first “unknown” as referring to protagonists’ 
knowledge of whether there is something to be known i.e. whether there is an area, situation etc. that protagonists 
need to know about, and the second unknown as referring to what there is to be known about that situation i.e. the 
details of the knowledge, then there is a third possibility (apart from the obvious fourth, the known known i.e. 
protagonists know that there is an area or situation that exists and know the details of it). This is the unknown 
known, an area or situation of which the protagonists do not know the existence or the importance of which they do 
not understand, but its details and/or importance are known to others - but not to protagonists. They may be known 
to third parties - analysts, competitors, governments, the people within the situation, but not by protagonists or 
decision-makers. 
 
This four-way classification is best represented by Table I, as below 
 
Table I. A typology of misinformation 
 
What there is 
to be known 
Unknown 
Protagonist knows about the area 
but does not know the data that 
describes the area or arises from it 
Protagonist does not know about the 
area, nor do third parties 
Known 
Protagonist knows about the area, 
knows the data about it 
Protagonist does not know the area 
exists, but third parties do 
  Known Unknown 
  Whether known to the protagonist 
Source: The authors 
 
The unknown known is often the refuge of perpetrators of DSIB, in forms such as “but we had no idea at the time 
that this was even a problem”, “this was a completely unintended consequence, which we  did not even consider a 
risk”, or “I was never told about this area, although I discovered later that my people knew about it”. In these areas, 
data mining and artificial intelligence and machine learning may be helpful. For example, if a health service manager 
might want to find areas of risk, while not knowing what these areas are, systems can be used to identify and learn 
about possible problem areas, such as high death rates in particular areas or hospitals (e.g. to know them), 
overcoming the problems caused by health services being assessed using quality standards based on “known 
knowns” (Beaussier et al., 2016). When this information is communicated to the manager, it then becomes a known 
known. Using the idea of unanticipated consequences as an excuse has been legitimised by writing about 
unexpected events, or “black swans” (Taleb, 2007). However, in some cases, a supposed “black swan” is really an 
example of poor risk analytics or poor risk management (Paté-Cornell, 2012; Aven, 2015). 
 
The situation is more complicated than shown in Table I, for several reasons: 
• In practice the known/unknown distinction is rarely binary, but a continuum from completely unknown, to 
suspected but not known, to part known, to known but not in detail, to known in detail. Some risks may be 
emerging, perhaps deriving from a new phenomenon e.g. a pattern of behaviour, and so perhaps unknown, 
partly known or even just suspected by different parties (Renn, 2014; O’Rourke, 2016). Emergent risk is 
particularly important in the insurance industry, where failure to spot and mitigate emerging risk can threaten 
profit via an unanticipated claims level. 
• When we say that “an organization knows”, we commit the sin of personification. An organization does not know, 
but its people do. So, some may know well, some partly and some not at all. 
• Protagonists and analysts may not be clearly separated. They may be in the same organization, or the analysts 
may be in the pay of the protagonists, as for example in the case of auditors, when their independence and 
desired scepticism may be compromised by the nature of the commercial relationship, as we explain later in this 
article. In the case of external organizations in the formal position of analysts, this relationship can be very 
complex (Stone et al., 2017b; Stone et al., 2003). 
• Techniques for analysing complex sets of information are advancing rapidly, transforming how humans relate to 
data (Slowik and Spinoni, 2018). For example, as we note later, artificial intelligence is becoming essential in 
analysis of large data sets. 
• There may be information asymmetry between protagonists and analysts, and between different categories of 
protagonists and analysts, so one group may carry out an analysis for which another group has not got the 
resources to carry out, and depending on the results of the analysis, DSIB may occur. This issue is particularly 
important in relation to governance (Brennan et al., 2016). 
• There may be a culture of DSIB in an organization, coming from middle or senior management, usually from 
leaders (Pfeffer, 2016), conspired in by many members of the organization, so from an independent analyst’s 
point of view, nothing said by protagonists to be known or unknown can reliably be classified as such. This culture 
may be related to the organization’s strategic situation. For example, market incumbents may construct a view of 
the world that confirms their dominance (Stone, 1984; Stone, 2015). 
• Protagonists may change their description of what is known or unknown because of errors made by their leaders 
or because of pressure from their leaders. Leaders may engage in deliberate DSIB, with middle management are 
forced to comply with it for fear of dismissal, while middle management may engage in deliberate DSIB because 
otherwise information would reveal their incompetence, and top management may unconsciously fall in line with 
the DSIB because they do not know of its existence. Figure 1 shows a simple decision tree illustrating choices 
faced by a CEO and board after a failure. In a company with a lying culture, the CEO, if aware of the failure, will lie 
consciously, and the board might back up the CEO’s assertion that the problem stemmed from an unknown 
unknown. 
 
Figure 1. A decision tree of lying 
 
Source: The authors 
 
The taxonomy 
One approach to analysing DSIB is to create a taxonomy not just of decision types but of decision situations, 
classified by their management and academic disciplines e.g. strategic planning, projects, operational. This is 
because the literature on lying and behavioural economics shows that incentives to engage in DSIB relate not just to 
individual decisions but are systemic i.e. present throughout a management process. The below taxonomy uses as 
input previous research (e.g. Scherpereel, 2006). We do not argue that this is the only way of approaching this topic, 
or even that it is better than the approaches used in other taxonomies e.g. the familiarity or repetitiveness of a 
decision, but we do argue that it is a fruitful angle. 
 
The taxonomy we use to classify decisions is as follows: 
• Business model 
• Strategy 
• Programme 
• Megaproject 
• Project 
• Operation 
 
Their characteristics are described in the Table below: 
Table II. Decision types and their characteristics 
 
Type of 
decision 
Process involved Main 
management/ 
stakeholder 
involvement – 
suggestions 
Examples Timescales Issues 
Business 
model 
Business initiation 
or transformation 
Senior 
management, 
corporate 
investors 
Low cost airline 
New information 
system 
Dis/reintermediation 
Duration of 
business – 
years, 
decades 
Systemic change, 
with risk of model 
not working, many 
unknown 
unknowns 
May involve new 
ecosystem, new 
platforms, new 
partners 
Strategy Strategic 
decision-making 
process (SDMP), 
change 
management 
Senior 
management 
decisions, middle 
management 
analysis 
New product line 
New market 
3-5 years More known 
knowns, but 
competitive issues 
can cause failure 
Often done with 
existing partners 
Programme Programme 
management, 
change 
management 
Senior 
management 
governance, 
middle 
management 
accountability 
Transformation to 
achieve major cost 
reductions 
Replacement of major 
systems 
Merger or acquisition 
2-4 years Significant change 
in work patterns & 
responsibilities for 
most people 
Should but often 
doesn’t involve 
change 
management 
Consist of multiple 
projects, so 
managing 
connections 
between them key 
Megaproject Megaproject 
management 
Senior 
management 
governance, 
middle 
management 
accountability 
New railway line, new 
aircraft 
2-4 years Many unknowns as 
may involve 
breaking new 
ground (literally in 
the case of 
construction) 
Project Project 
Management 
Middle 
management, 
specialist project 
managers 
IT system installation 
Product line extension 
New office 
1-2 years Few unknowns, but 
classic failures may 
arise due to 
misinformation 
Operations Routine decisions Middle & junior 
management, 
reporting to 
senior 
management  
Manufacturing 
Service delivery 
Ongoing Should be handled 
by routine 
information 
systems, but 
failures can still be 
covered up 
 
Source: The authors 
 
 
These types are closely related. There is an intimate relationship between strategic decision-making and business 
model decision-making, with some arguing that one is a subset of the other, in both directions (Stott et al., 2016; 
Parnell et al., 2018). Many strategic and business model decisions require transformation programmes, which can be 
described as a collection of projects, some of which (for the largest firms) are effectively mega-projects. Such 
transformations have special information requirements (Stone et al., 2017b; Parnell et al., 2018). Finally, some 
information input into these decisions arises from operations, so any DSIB applied to operational data (e.g. booking 
of sales ahead of them taking place, registering that a project action has been completed when it has not) can feed 
into higher level decisions, and this “infects” them. A special aspect of DSIB is competitive information, which often 
consists of “soft” information about actual or planned activities of competitors. This kind of information is 
particularly subject to DSIB (Stone, 2015). The literature on use of information is well-defined in the case of SDMP 
and project management, and it is on this research that our review focuses. 
 
The types of DSIB that can occur are classified as shown in Table III: 
 
Table III. Types of DSIB 
DSIB type Examples 
Deliberate 
falsification 
Deliberate denial 
Concealment 
Deliberate individual falsification of source information 
Conspiracy with others to falsify source information 
Deliberate individual misinterpretation 
Conspiracy with others to misinterpret 
Sins of 
omission 
Ignorance 
Unconscious denial 
Avoidance of information search 
Unconscious misinterpretation 
Sins of 
commission 
Poor prioritisation/weak focus on essentials (risks, benefits) 
Overconfidence 
Over-reliance on intuition 
Over-reliance on existing systems & processes (we have always done it this way) 
Optimistic interpretation of information that might be regarded as negative or not 
supporting a particular decision 
Business case flawed (e.g. benefits exaggerated, costs minimised & information 
now changed to fit case rather than reality 
Biased governance – stakeholders with interests that conflict with those of the 
organization influencing decisions in favour of their own interests 
System or 
process 
problems 
Information incompetence – systems & processes do not deliver required 
information & situation is tolerated 
Unconscious or deliberate creation/sustaining of a process/system known to 
support a particular type of DSIB 
 
Source: The authors 
 
 
Previous research 
In this review, we focus on three areas, as follows: 
• The general research on DSIB, particularly on lying and behavioural bias in managing information 
• Project management research, focusing on construction and software projects 
• SDMP, focusing particularly on the three areas conventionally researched – rationality, intuition and politics, and 
their implications for DSIB. 
 
The review has been limited to what we consider to be the most seminal research in the area. 
Lying and behavioural bias 
Amongst the first researchers to signal the general risk of DSIB were Cyert and March (1963), who suggested that 
members of an organization may have incentives to manipulate information, from lying to presenting data in a 
biased way, so as to influence decisions. Table IV below gives evidence that DSIB is systematic and widespread in 
business. The combination of overconfidence and biased governance is particularly toxic! 
 
Table IV. General evidence of DSIB 
 
Reference Focus Findings DSIB implications 
Baker et al. 
(2002) 
Sources of 
irrational 
behaviour 
Apparently irrational financial behaviour 
can stem from investors or managers. 
When the main source is investors, 
managers must be insulated from short-
term share price pressure, allowing them 
to take “correct” decisions that may be 
unpopular in the market, while if it is 
managers, discretion must be reduced 
and managers forced to pay more 
attention to the market. 
Managerial discretion may lead to 
covering up or falsification of 
information relating to the returns 
to particular actions, if these are at 
variance with the market’s view. 
Stronger governance is required to 
prevent this. 
Grover 
(2005) 
Causes and 
management of 
workplace lying 
Lying is part of every manager's life. 
People may lie purely for their own 
benefit, but many lies are associated with 
competitive and social pressures. People 
vary in their propensity to lie. Nearly 
everyone lies in bargaining situations, but 
only some people lie when faced with 
People need to rationalize their lies, 
and organizational cultures 
emphasizing honesty do not seem 
to reduce lying. Rather, they drive 
lying underground. We should 
therefore always be on the look-out 
for lying. 
conflicting expectations. 
Güner et al. 
(2008) 
Biased 
governance 
Having bankers on a corporation’s board 
increases financing to firms with good 
credit and few financial constraints, but 
poor investment opportunities. Having 
investment bankers on the board is 
associated with more frequent outside 
financing, larger public debt issues and 
poorer firm performance after 
acquisitions.  
Banker-directors act in the best 
interests of creditors, so board 
financial expertise may not be in the 
best interest of shareholders. The 
advisory role of directors is affected 
by director interests that conflict 
with those of shareholders. 
Governance needs strengthening to 
prevent this. 
Lovallo and 
Kahneman 
(2003) 
Delusional 
optimism 
Many business initiatives fail due to 
“delusional optimism”, which includes 
emphasizing projects’ potential benefits, 
underestimating their likely costs, and 
creating and promoting success scenarios 
while ignoring the possibility of errors. 
This is due to cognitive biases and 
organizational pressures to accentuate 
the positive. 
Aggressive goals can motivate teams 
and improve the chances of success, 
but external forecasts should be 
used to decide whether to commit. 
However, this implies that the 
managers concerned have an 
interest in realism, although they 
may not, particularly if the pay-off is 
distant and the returns are near 
term. 
Malmendier 
and Tate 
(2005) 
CEO  
overconfidence 
Overconfident CEOs systematically 
overestimate the return to investment 
projects. This is confirmed in many other 
studies of theirs e.g. Malmendier and 
Tate (2008).  
Independent directors may help 
cure this tendency, but as Güner et 
al. (2008) suggests if these are 
investment bankers, the result could 
be just as bad. 
Malmendier 
and Tate 
(2009) 
Superstar CEOs CEOs who win awards perform worse 
after winning them. Award-winning CEOs 
spent more time on public and private 
activities outside their companies e.g. 
taking other board seats or writing books. 
Award-winning CEOs underperform 
relative to their prior performance and to 
a matched sample of non-winning CEO. 
The effects are strongest in firms with 
weakest corporate governance. 
Information relating to the quality 
of senior management often refers 
to winning awards, but this is 
negatively correlated with 
performance. Weak corporate 
governance makes the situation 
worse. Senior managers should be 
discouraged by their boards from 
this kind of narcissistic behaviour. 
Malmendier 
et al. (2018) 
Long run effects 
of mergers 
Where two or more companies had a 
significant ex ante chance of winning 
(close contests), companies that failed to 
take over did better than those that 
succeeded, when their returns were 
similar before the take-over contest. 
Returns from the merger were often 
exaggerated (perhaps by both parties). 
Take-overs are often toxic and 
should be discouraged, particularly 
if estimates of likely returns come 
from the managers who are keen on 
the take-over. 
Schenk 
(2017) 
Rogue trading in 
a bank 
The actions of a rogue trader were driven 
by seeking individual reputation, while 
senior executives took no responsibility, 
nor were they viewed as responsible. 
Stronger governance and better 
information management is 
required to control the actions of 
individual managers, particularly 
when they can take actions that can 
lead to greatly increased exposure. 
 
Source: The authors 
 
 
DSIB in Projects 
The project literature has very strong coverage of the information management issue, as shown in Table V. 
 
Table V. DSIB in projects 
 
Source: The authors 
 
 
DSIB in SDMP 
Although the rapidly growing literature on SDMP has not focused on DSIB, it gives much insight into the nature of 
the SDMP and hence its vulnerability to DSIB, as shown in Table VI. As we stated earlier, it is harder to research DSIB 
in SDMP directly, as this may involve managers admitting deliberate deception. 
 
Table VI. DSIB in SDMP 
 
Reference Focus Findings DSIB implications 
Thomas and 
McDaniel 
(1990) 
Effects of strategy and 
the information-
processing structure 
of top management 
Strategy and information-
processing structures are partly 
determined by how business 
leaders define and analyse 
The bias of the SDMP towards the 
leader’s interpretation of strategic 
situations must be recognised and 
challenged. 
Reference Focus Findings DSIB implications 
Clegg (2008) The need to view 
project 
management 
with a political 
perspective 
Flyvbjerg (1998) identifies that when 
power and knowledge are entwined, the 
greater the power, the less the need for 
rationality. Power dominates rationality. 
Those with power define the reality of the 
project to further their preferences, using 
any strategies and tactics. 
Project managers and those 
responsible for project governance 
must be alert to this tendency and 
create sources of information on 
project progress that are truly 
independent of those with power. 
Flyvbjerg 
(2009) 
Why the worst 
infrastructure 
gets built 
Biased cost-benefit analyses arise from 
incentives to promoters of infrastructure 
projects to underestimate costs and 
overestimate benefits, to gain approval 
and funding. Projects made to look best in 
business cases - often intentionally - 
generate the highest cost overruns and 
benefit shortfalls, leading to ‘survival of the 
unfittest’, with the projects made to look 
best performing the worst. Researching 
intentional deception is difficult, but can be 
done (Flyvbjerg, 2004; Wachs, 1990). 
Use ‘reference class forecasting’ 
(examining similar past situations 
and outcomes) in project business 
cases (Flyvbjerg, 2004) to reduce 
inaccuracy and bias, to 
compensate for cognitive 
forecasting bias (Kahneman, 1994; 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Priemus, 
Flyvbjerg 
and van 
Wee (2008) 
Decision-making 
on mega-projects 
Mega-projects are often poorly thought 
through, with all options not taken into 
account, benefits systematically 
overestimated, costs systematically 
underestimated, and little or no learning 
from past experiences. Errors for recent 
projects are often larger than for earlier 
ones. 
More attention should be paid to 
learning from past projects, from 
planning through to 
implementation. 
Glass, Rost 
and Matook 
(2008) 
Lying on software 
projects 
The main forms of lying on software 
projects are early cost and schedule 
estimates, status reporting during the 
project and political manoeuvring. The 
rarest form of lying was hype. When lying 
happens, developers often know about 
lying even when management does not. 
Estimation and political-manoeuvring lies 
came mainly from management, status-
report lies came mainly from project leads, 
and hype mainly from marketing. 
More focus on trust, control and 
independence of information 
provision is required. 
teams on interpreting 
strategic situations. 
strategic situations. 
Hough and 
White (2004) 
Scanning and 
information gathering 
for strategic decision 
making in situations of 
environmental 
dynamism 
Environmental dynamism and a 
manager's functional position 
explains scanning behaviour. 
Scanning behaviour may be 
unrelated to the need for 
information and is vulnerable to 
bias by those scanning or 
managing scanning. 
Scanning and information gathering 
are critical activities and require 
stronger governance, particularly in 
situations of environmental 
dynamism, where it may not be 
clear which information is most 
needed for decisions. 
Carmeli, 
Tishler and 
Edmondson 
(2012) 
CEO relational 
leadership and 
strategic decision 
quality in top 
management teams, 
including the role of 
team trust and the 
extent of learning 
from failure 
Trust between top management 
team members had an important 
influence on CEO relational 
leadership and the extent of team 
learning from failures, which in 
turn affects strategic decision 
quality. 
CEOs can improve the quality of 
strategic decisions by their top 
management teams by shaping a 
relational context of trust and 
facilitating learning from failures. 
Where trust does not exist, learning 
from failures will be weak, so 
information relating to failures may 
be suppressed. 
Hough and 
White (2003) 
Environmental 
dynamism and 
strategic decision‐
making rationality 
Environmental dynamism affects 
the relationship between rational‐
comprehensive decision making 
and decision quality. 
A dynamic, unstable environment 
can pose problems for decision-
making rationality and open the 
door to DSIB, so stronger 
governance of decision-making is 
needed in such situations. 
Citroen (2011) The role of 
information in 
strategic decision-
making 
Executives using a rational 
approach collect and use ample 
information in a structured multi-
phase decision-making process in 
which information plays a crucial 
role in reducing uncertainty. 
More relevant information on issues 
affecting choices allows board 
decisions to be better controlled and 
more rational However, it is still 
vulnerable to DSIB. 
Aravopoulou 
et al. (2018) 
Strategic decision-
making process in 
times of crisis 
Rationality is a key dimension of 
SDMP. Decision-makers use 
intuition in the form of past 
experience when making 
acquisition decisions, whilst their 
personal judgment and “inner 
voice” are neglected, and political 
behaviour is not displayed. 
DSIB can be avoided when 
rationality prevails and there is no or 
little political behaviour when there 
is strong focus on identifying and 
analysing all required information, 
use of external financial advisors, 
reliance on many methods of 
information gathering, and when 
decision-makers are open with each 
other about their interests and 
preferences and there is no 
bargaining, negotiation or use of 
power amongst them. 
Frishammar 
(2003) 
Information use in 
strategic decision 
making 
The SDMP starts with soft 
information (visions, ideas, 
intuition, cognitive structures, 
etc.), used to decide which hard 
information is relevant, moving to 
hard/numerical information, then 
back to soft information for the 
final decision. Internal/close 
information sources (e.g. staff, 
customers) seem to be preferred 
over external ones, while solicited 
information tends to be preferred 
to unsolicited information. 
Managers may not be sufficiently 
active in seeking more of the 
important information they need, 
and may be biased in their 
solicitation of information. Tough 
questions should therefore always 
be asked about the information 
gathering and interpretation process 
that supports SDMP. 
Papadakis, 
Lioukas and 
Chambers 
(1998) 
The role of 
management and 
context in SDMP 
The SDMP is influenced by 
characteristics which are decision-
speciﬁc, top management factors 
and contextual factors. Decision-
speciﬁc ones seem to have the 
strongest inﬂuence on the SDMP. 
Management may manipulate the 
meaning or categorization of 
strategic issues, to inﬂuence 
organizational responses e.g. 
manipulating information from 
external to internal systems, such 
as ‘Environmental Scanning’ or 
‘Strategic Issue Management’ or 
‘Boundary Spanning’ systems, to 
serve their own goals.  
Management may filter information 
and manipulate decision-speciﬁc 
characterizations to control 
rationality, formalization, lateral 
communication, hierarchical 
decentralization, and even internal 
political activity. Strong governance 
is required to control this tendency. 
Dean and 
Sharfman 
(1993) 
Procedural rationality 
in SDMP 
Environment (competitive threat), 
organization (external control), and 
strategic issue (uncertainty) jointly 
affect procedural rationality. SDMP 
procedures were most rational 
when competitive threat and 
external control were limited, and 
problems were not uncertain. 
When firms are in environments of 
little competitive threat, when they 
perceive little external control and 
are facing well-understood issues, 
they use rational procedures. DSIB is 
therefore more likely in situations of 
environmental turbulence. 
Miller and 
Ireland (2005) 
The role of intuition in 
strategic decision-
making 
Intuition is a troublesome decision 
tool. 
It is particularly vulnerable to DSIB, 
so strong governance is required, 
focusing on monitoring for DSIB. 
Abrahamson 
and Baumard 
(2008) 
The organisational 
facade 
Reputations can be made or lost in 
a moment, so façades pervade 
organizations in scale and in scope, 
perhaps deliberately manufactured 
to create external support (e.g. 
investors), when they bear no 
relation to organizational reality. 
Lying behaviour associated with 
constructing a façade may be 
infectious, leading to other kinds of 
DSIB, which can only be controlled 
by stronger governance. 
Eisenhardt 
(1989) 
Strategic decision-
making speed in a 
high- velocity 
environment 
Fast decision-makers use more, 
not less, information than slow 
decision-makers, based on more 
alternatives, leading to superior 
performance. 
Slow decision-making is not 
necessarily good decision, and may 
give more scope for DSIB to emerge, 
so management should be aware of 
the greater need for governance in 
these situations. 
 
Source: The authors 
 
Financial DSIB 
Financial DSIB, which applies not just to the financial services sector but to all financial issues (such as company 
reports and accounts), is so serious and widespread that it is the subject of many reports. Much DSIB that originates 
in other kinds of information is translated into financial DSIB. Exaggerated sales become exaggerated revenues and 
profits, strategic risks turn into losses and so on. 
 
A serious source of financial DSIB is the existence of many different stakeholders in a company, each pulling in 
different financial directions and wanting financial figures to tell different stories. We have already discussed the 
issue of personification of companies – treating companies as if they are unitary entities, when they consist of many 
individuals and organizational units, each with different attitudes to and involvement in business initiatives – choice 
of business model or strategy, management of programmes, projects and operations. For example, in banks, just in 
the area related to risk management, can be found compliance specialists, quality assurers, risk managers, internal 
auditors, investigators and of course senior and middle management, and this does not include those managing 
stakeholders who may need to be involved – staff in customer services and sales, in branches and contact centres. As 
the last few years have shown, no matter how many such people exist, and no matter how well aligned they may be 
in principle, it is not easy to manage them together to manage risk, including that generated by the DSIB of staff 
within the bank. 
 
One issue that allows large companies to get away with serious DSIB is the appointment of seemingly independent 
non-executive directors who are actually not independent, with their main “duty” being to make a board look 
impressive rather than to exercise a strong due-diligence function. This pattern is visible throughout industry (and 
increasingly in the public sector), but can be particularly damaging in financial services, where the risks are so great. 
In some cases, non-executive directors are members of many boards, giving them little time to focus in depth on 
each company of whose boards they are a member. This phenomenon is known as “overboarding” (Marlow, 2017). 
 
These and similar problems have led to the emergence of a model-based approach to the management of risk, the 
three lines of defence model (Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors, 2015), involving separating the functions that 
a) own and manage risk b) oversee risk and c) provide independent assurance. The first group owns and manages 
risk and engages with the second group to agree polices and risk limits which match the banks’ risk appetite and 
relevant delegated authorities, using business practices established to meet their objectives whilst managing risk in 
accordance with these. The second group establishes policies and limits for the first group which match the agreed 
(and governed) risk and may also control aggregate risks by risk type. Immature of weakness in the first group 
demands greater scale, capability and strength in the second group. The third group checks the effectiveness of 
processes and controls from end to end. 
 
This approach should work well in theory, but is not immune to systemic DSIB to which banks and others are prone 
(e.g. denial, restricted environmental scanning), sometimes accentuated by command lines in which those with 
overall responsibility can force particular interpretations of risk (e.g. that risk is lower than it actually is) on more 
junior staff. The main way to avoid this is true independence between groups, perhaps even using external checks, 
and a healthy dose of scepticism in any auditing (Lherm, 2016). 
 
Each sector has its own particular pattern of DSIB. In one sector of financial services, the patterns were analysed by 
the Fixed Income, Currencies and Commodities (FICC) Market Standards Compliance Board (FMSB). Nearly every 
category of the dark side behaviour involved manipulating information, ranging from creating deliberately 
misleading patterns of information to falsifying information directly. All the categories analysed were entirely 
deliberate and so akin to lying. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case studies 
 
Overview 
There is not the space to give detailed case studies – instead, we have provided references to where more detailed 
statements of situations can be found. As our review of research shows, DSIB is common. It is literally almost 
everywhere. So in analysing an organization, the critical question is not whether DSIB exists, but what was and is the 
extent of its influence on it– then and now, and whether it reflects a severe underlying problem in terms of how 
modern society works. 
 
Our case studies cover several sectors (it would be easy to compile a list that is just financial services), including 
public and private sectors. One weakness of the list is its focus on large organizations, on which information about 
DSIB is more easily available because they are investigated by analysts, the media and governments and have a 
larger number and wider range of stakeholder interested in their behaviour and governance. All the cases have been 
selected from Western developed countries, partly because they reflect the authors’ knowledge base, but also partly 
because if we were to include other countries, particularly developing nations, we would be swamped with 
examples, as world indices on fraud and governance indicate, for example the Corruption Perceptions Index (2017). 
We have selected case studies only of project, programme and strategic initiatives, and not other DSIB contexts. The 
main case study covers the authors’ own industry. This is followed by a brief summary of other cases (Table VII). 
 Higher education SDMP 
The problems caused by poor use of information in higher education institution (HEI) strategic decision making were 
highlighted by Al Dhaen (2017) and Hargreaves and Stone (2017). The latter highlights a particular severe case of 
information denial, in which senior management in many UK universities refused to take seriously the likely impact 
of a short-term decline in student numbers caused by a dip in the size of the cohort of university applicants, making 
investments that drained their cash, so that they were forced to contract, despite clear evidence of a likely upturn a 
few years later. 
 
Tromp and Ruben (2010, p. 4) state that “there are generally few carrots and sticks available to leaders as incentives 
(or disincentives) and where the communication and organizational challenges are far from trivial”. In the UK, the 
issue of strategic planning and re-formation of university mission and vision has become an important priority, 
including meeting objectives of international accreditation bodies and meeting f quality standards, both of which are 
put at risk by unethical behaviour relating to claims concerning quality (Stone and Starkey, 2011). 
 
Leaders of UK higher education rely on intuition in their decision-making, but should support their decisions with 
rationality and rely on specific strategic information, rather than plan in an ad hoc and occasional manner 
(Universities UK, 2011). Rowley (1997) highlight the need for communication and participation in the strategic 
planning process, specifically during strategic change and mission development, and identify that failure of strategic 
planning is often due to inadequate information. Strategic plans are often developed in a highly centralized and 
intuitive manner by senior management (Al Dhaen, 2017; Hargreaves and Stone, 2017). This intuitive planning leads 
to many HEIs facing challenges in digital transformation, due to poor planning (Ladd, 2016) and in resource planning 
(Hinton, 2012). Hargreaves and Stone (2017) argue that senior university management sometime confuse excellence 
of research, teaching and academic leadership with managerial competence. As highlighted in the SDMP literature 
review, strong governance is often an antidote to DSIB, but it is often absent in universities. In the Gulf Co-operation 
Council region, lack of transparency and accountability is a serious problem (Gashgari, 2017). 
 
Other industry examples 
Table VII: DSIB in other industries 
 
Industry Issue 
Accounting The accounting industry provides many examples of DSIB, particularly for denial of conflict of 
interest that results from a strategic focus on developing consulting and other advisory services 
and selling them to audit clients or from focusing on maximising fees from audit clients, leading to 
audits becoming window-dressing, as the auditing firm fears loss of the client. This DSIB is usually 
a direct result of unethical decisions by senior managers (Meckfessel and Sellers, 2017; The 
Economist, 2018) 
Automotive This industry, once famous for focus on fashion rather than safety (Nader, 1965), has produced 
strategic cover-ups relating to pollution. These may result from individual middle management 
DSIB, resulting from attempts to meet targets, subsequently covered up and/or denied by senior 
managers. (See Leggett. 2018). 
Banking There are many reports about concealed strategic dependence on mortgage markets before the 
financial crisis, often in the form of banks’ off-balance sheet vehicles that governments knew 
about but were slow to regulate or never regulated. Governments were deeply complicit in what 
was effectively a cover up, particularly in the UK, Germany and the US. This is nearly always a 
result of DSIB by senior managers and/or polticians, who created the strategy and lied about its 
impact (See e.g. Deutsche Welle, 2018; McNeil, 2014; Olson, 2007; Patrick's Blog, 2018; Theil, 
2009). There are also many reports of major systems failures when attempts to upgrade systems 
go wrong, following classic software project patterns, for example BBC (2018).  
Construction A frequent problem is cover-up of delays in one part of a project that leads to delays in other parts 
because other stakeholders are not informed of delays. This normally starts with middle 
management denial or cover-up, with senior management then becoming complicit. (See e.g. 
Construction News, 2014; Construction News, 2018; Sharp, 2018). 
Governments Here, falsification of evidence about military achievements and threats, to justify strategic 
commitment of resources to conflicts, are very common, e.g. US involvement in Vietnam and US 
and UK military involvement in the Middle East. Such DSIB nearly always involves conspiracy to lie 
at the highest levels, after information provided by middle-level managers or state employees 
proves incompatible with the views of the seniors. (See e.g.  Beliefnet.com, 2018; Ellsberg, 2001; 
Marlantes, 2017; McSmith, 2016; Taylor, 2013; The Guardian, 2014).  
Information 
technology 
As our summary of work on software projects indicates, one of the most serious causes of failure 
is simple over-optimism and lying about capabilities and values of assets. This usually involves 
senior management. (See e.g. Finkle and Leske, 2012; Flinders, 2012; Foss et al., 2008; Fruhlinger 
and Wailgum, 2017; King, 2010; March, 2006; 0ut-law.com, 2018; Pries and Stone, 2004; The 
Guardian, 2013, 2016; Wright, 2011). 
Pensions Poor strategic management of assets and involvement in businesses that do not fit with 
objectives, especially prior to demutualisation, are the main areas cited. Senior management DSIB 
is often driven by direct financial incentives. (See e.g. Fraser, 2004; Mathews, 2000). 
Retailing Under pressure from changing demographic and behavioural patterns (e.g. Internet buying), many 
retailers have been caught out with antiquated business models, but are slow to admit this 
strategic planning failure to their shareholders. Accurate evidence provided by middle managers is 
often suppressed by senior managers. (See e.g. Espiner and Atkinson, 2016; Heller (2004); Ibitoye, 
2017; Moore, 2018; Ruddick, 2013). 
 
Source: The authors 
 
 
Management implications 
 
Behavioural and managerial factors 
Our review of research shows that various behavioural and managerial ways to avoid DSIB. They include avoidance 
of politics, improved governance, trust, honesty – including awareness of pressures to engage in DSIB, and balancing 
intuition and rationality. Several relate specifically to information, such as learning from experience, via detailed 
analysis of past similar situations, admission and investigation of the known/unknown situation and frequent 
recalibration in line with new information. In situations where DSIB occurs, it makes sense to evaluate these factors 
to see where improvements are required. 
 
Use of information technology 
The advent of big data should have made mismanagement based on any kind of information error (including DSIB) 
less common, particularly given the emergence of the insight discipline (particularly customer insight), the increased 
ease of managing and accessing information (Stone et al., 2017a) and analysis of how to make insight more effective 
by ensuring that senior managers understand the story told by the data (Stone et al., 2015). However, big data 
without intelligence and analysis merely leads to a situation of overload, which is why big data and analytics should 
go hand in hand (Wright et al., 2018). 
 
In “soft” situations (Petkov et al., 2007; Hicks, 2004), one problem is knowing where to focus analysis. A report from 
Tata Communications (2018) suggests that artificial intelligence may help, by offering a counter-opinion, avoiding 
the problem of false consensus and group-think. This builds on research on the importance of cognitive diversity, 
which so far has focused mainly on the importance of having different points of views, often from the perspective of 
different types of individual (Mohammed and Ringseis, 2001). Using artificial intelligence to create a different 
viewpoint requires conscious admission by management that without such artificial intelligence, they risk making a 
wrong decision based on DSIB that they may themselves have initiated or conspired to create, including through 
suppression of cognitive diversity. 
 
Management checklist 
Here, we identify questions managers should ask about how information about initiatives (projects, programmes or 
strategic initiatives) is being managed in their organization. When answers to these questions are weak or absent, it 
indicates the need to tread carefully! Senior managers who hear that these questions are being asked may try to 
suppress enquiry and force departure of staff asking the questions, so strong governance is critical in this area, but 
may itself be resisted by senior managers committing DSIB. 
 
Information quality and analysis 
• Does the information we are using to manage the initiative have the right quality –completeness, currency, 
integrity, accuracy, accessibility, consistency, objectivity, transparency, relevance? 
• Is the interdependence between different elements understood – in relation to both quality and value of data 
items? 
• Is their diversity in the sources and interpretation of information? 
• Is the information used to plan and estimate the feasibility of initiatives compared with similar information for 
past initiatives, whether undertaken by the organization itself or by similar external organizations? 
 
Information management and governance 
• Do we know what the risks of initiatives? Are we managing them? Are they logged on a risk register related to 
each initiative? Is the register being managed? Do we have contingency plans? 
• Is there proper governance of initiatives and their risks etc? Are the right people involved in governance? Is there 
a steering group? If so, how well does it function? 
• Is there transparent stakeholder management, in relation to information used in planning or executing 
initiatives? 
• Is there proper and focused management of initiatives, in the sense of having clear accountability and structures 
allocating responsibility for documenting progress and for achieving success? 
• Do those managing initiatives have access to the right information? 
• Are we sharing and transmitting information about initiatives to all relevant stakeholders? 
• Do we know how much of any initiative has been achieved so far, at any stage from planning and resource 
allocation to actions and measurement? 
• Are risks of projects, programmes or strategic initiatives disguised as dis-benefits or vice versa? 
• Are consequences that are described as unintended or unexpected actually intended or forecast? 
• Have stakeholders developed an exit plan that allows them to look good after an initiative fails? If so, is this 
affecting their involvement/commitment? 
• Are there strong incentives to any stakeholder or group of stakeholders to create misinformation? Are 
stakeholders motivated to compound misinformation or cover up failures? (This is known as the slippery slope.) 
• If there is deliberate information mismanagement, how are those doing it defeating the information systems and 
processes designed to provide the correct information? 
 
Implications for university teaching and research 
The implications are straightforward. Teachers of or researchers into management need to be careful in interpreting 
statements made by managers about their performance or intentions. They should be particularly alert to the 
tendency of managers to engage in DSIB and to put up a facade or to window-dress the situation. This approach 
should be integrated into all management teaching and into training of academic researchers into business 
behaviour. It is not enough simply to “plug in” courses on business ethics as an afterthought. Teaching in all business 
disciplines, particularly in finance, project management, strategy, marketing and information systems, should include 
content and exercises designed to help students explore the incidence and impact of DSIB. 
 
Implications for government and regulators 
In most developed countries, government and regulators are now highly alert to the incidence and impact of DSIB, 
and of the vulnerability to DSIB of organizations of all kinds, whether they be private sector, charities or public 
agencies. DSIB is a systemic characteristic of organizational behaviour, but also – as we have seen so clearly in the 
last decade or so – of government and regulators, who like to position themselves as being above DSIB but are often 
complicit in it. The common elements of remedies to DSIB are transparency and independence of governance. 
However, these too are subject to manipulation and DSIB, within regulators and governments as well as in other 
organizations, for example, in the form of claims that transparency and governance existed when those responsible 
for it were themselves complicit in DSIB. So, our conclusion to this section and to this article overall is – be vigilant! 
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